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Abstract—Doing route selection based in part on source ad-
dresses is a form of policy routing, which has started to receive
increased amounts of attention. In this paper, we extend our
previous work on ROLF (ROuting as the Firewall Layer) to
achieve source prefix filtering. This permits easy definition of
“inside” and “outside”, even in MANET environment where
there is no topological boundary. We present algorithms for route
propagation and packet forwarding using ROFL; we measure its
performance in a simulated environment with two different ad
hoc routing protocols. Simulation results demonstrate that ROFL
can significantly reduce unwanted packets without extra control
traffic incurred, and thus improves overall system performance
and preserves battery power of mobile nodes. ROFL is the
first scheme to provide a concrete defense against some battery
exhaustion attacks in MANETs. Moreover, it requires only minor
changes to existing ad hoc network routing protocols, making it
practical and feasible to be deployed in real world.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Firewalls have long been a mainstay of network security.
While their utility has diminished in recent years [4] due to
increasingly rich topologies, they are still valuable. In recent
work [19], [21], we extended firewalls to work with mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs), using routing protocols to imple-
ment the firewall layer. MANETs, which are self-configuring
networks consisting of mobile devices connected by wireless
links, are not amenable to protection by traditional firewalls.
Nodes in MANETs are free to move, causing network topol-
ogy to change rapidly and unpredictably. The lack of network
infrastructure makes each node serve as a router that relays
packets towards other nodes. There are no topological choke
points to block unwanted traffic. Our solution, ROFL (Routing
as the Firewall Layer), treats destination port number as part of
the address during routing. Consequently, packets intended for
forbidden services are dropped closer to source. This serves
two important purposes: it not only helps implement a security
policy, it causes unwanted packets to be dropped as early as
possible, thus conserving battery power.
In common with most firewalls and routing protocols, ROFL
makes its security decisions based on destination addresses and
port numbers. For wired networks, this is quite proper, since
it is not possible to trust source addresses come from beyond
the firewall [9]. In MANETs, where connectivity patterns are
constantly changing, the situation is subtly different. While
it remains true that behavior of “untrusted” nodes (i.e., those
not protected by firewall) cannot be relied upon for security
purposes, adding source address constraints to firewall rules
have a second, and equally important function: they define
the boundaries of policy region. That is, source address rules
define the boundary between the “inside” — the portion of
the network protected by firewall — and the outside. In
a traditional wired network, firewall itself is the boundary
marker, as network topology determines the inside and outside.
In the MANET shown in Figure 1(a)(i), nodes I1 and I2
provide firewall functionality against outside node O1. In
Figure 1(a)(ii), nodes I1 and O1 have moved, changing the
connectivity patterns. I2 can no longer reach I1 except by
going through O1; in addition, I4 has a direct link to O1 and
must activate firewall mechanisms against traffic originating
from it. We must now rely on O1’s source address to make
such decisions, rather than on a fixed topology. In ROFL, we
use the routing system to implement firewall functionality.
If we now use source addresses as part of our firewall
mechanism, we must also use them in routing. This, then,
requires that we implement a policy routing scheme.
From a quantitative perspective, ROFL has some interesting
characteristics. Clearly, it will save power by dropping un-
wanted packets early; how great the savings are will depend
on the rate of unwanted traffic. A tactical MANET is never a
closed network; there is always the chance that some network
node will be compromised and used to attack other nodes.
Accordingly, very fine-grained permission mechanisms are
highly desirable, to minimize the damage from any such
incidents. In other words, in any given MANET, not all nodes
will be able to access all services on all other nodes.
As the network’s topology changes, this constraint can be
problematic. In Figure 1(a)(i), I1, I2, I3, I4, and I5 are allowed
to speak to each other for some service, while O1 is not. As the
nodes move (Figure 1(a)(ii)), I3 should no longer even attempt
to transmit to I1, since its only path goes through O1, a node
untrusted. If I3 transmits nevertheless, that traffic is must be
dropped at some point. Without ROFL, the drop point would
be I2 or I4, since they are aware of the path. With ROFL, I3
itself would know not to transmit, thereby saving power. The
tradeoffs are complex. We have saved power and preserved
security by not sending via an untrusted node. On the other
hand, a desired communication has been blocked, not because
O1 has become evil but because we fear that it may happen.
To the best of our knowledge, ROFL is the first scheme
to provide a concrete defense against some battery exhaustion
attacks in MANETs. Other contributions include: 1) we extend
our previous work on ROFL to include source prefix filtering
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(a) Two different topologies in a
MANET, after O1 has moved.
Net C
Net A Net BT
(b) Two subnets connected by both
a transit node and a transit net.
Fig. 1: MANET topologies.
to implement a policy routing scheme; 2) we provide algo-
rithms for route propagation and packet forwarding to cope
with existing routing protocols; 3) we demonstrate the high
performance of ROFL as a firewall mechanism in MANETs
using simulation. The results show that, for AODV routing
protocol when nodes moving at a moderate speed of 10 m/s
and a 10% bad traffic rate, ROFL reduced 8.4% of data packets
and 11.5% of control packets transmitted; with 20% bad traffic,
the reductions were 18.6% and 21.4%. The same trend was ob-
served when the amount of malicious traffic growths. Similar
results were also observed with OLSR routing protocol.
In Section II, we summarize the basic ROFL scheme
proposed previously. Section III introduces the new policy
routing mechanism. Section IV provides algorithms for route
propagation and packet forwarding for the new scheme. Sec-
tion V describes the protocol design for implementing ROFL
with existing MANET routing protocols. In Section VI, we
study ROFL’s performance through network simulations. We
finish with a discussion of related work and conclusions drawn.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Basic ROFL Scheme
The ROFL scheme is based on a simple notion: services
— that are, port numbers — should be treated as part of the
IP address in the routing system. If a certain service is not
advertised to a particular network, no host on that network
can reach it; the routing system will not deliver the packets.
We thus use every router along the path as a firewall. There are
many benefits to this scheme, especially in MANETs where
battery power is limited. If unwanted packets are dropped very
early, a lot of power can be saved by not transmitting those
packets. In ROFL, we extend the prefix field of a conventional
routing advertisement to include a service s, and a ROFL
announcement is R = {d : s/m, M}
where d is an address prefix, s is a service port number, m
is a prefix length, and M is a routing metric. To block a
service, we advertise an infinity route with M =∞. Virtually
all useful protocols require replies from servers to the clients.
This implies that there must be a route to client ports. Such
kind of routes to client ports be handled similarly to service-
specific routes. (Full details are given in [21].)
ROFL takes advantage of underlying routing protocol to dis-
seminate service-specific route information. There is no need
to implement a separate route propagation phase. Moreover,
ROFL advertisements are handled just like any other routing
advertisements: the source node and any intermediate routers
do a longest-prefix match on the advertisement. If there is no
matching route, the packet is dropped.
B. Extensions of ROFL
There are a number of extensions that may also prove to
be useful. One is to route on IPsec SPIs instead of the port
numbers, since port numbers are not visible to intermediate
nodes for encrypted traffic. Routing on SPIs permits early drop
of many fake packets. It is especially useful if fine-grained
SPIs are used, as in distributed firewalls. Note that ROFL and
cryptography are orthogonal issues. Cryptographic techniques
provide confidentiality and integrity of communications; the
goal of ROFL is not to replace cryptography, but rather to
drop unwanted packets early to save transmission power.
A second extension is to separate port number from IP
address, and instead pass a list of permitted or prohib-
ited port numbers along with a prefix announcement. This
would allow a single announcement (and hence FIB entry)
to handle many services. More importantly, it would easily
handle ROFL announcement for an entire network, such as
{192.0.2.0/24, {25, 80},M}. However, this would require an
additional lookup step not part of destination prefix matching;
additionally, it might conflict with the desire to route different
services differently.
III. POLICY ROUTING WITH ROFL
A. ROFL with Source Prefix Filtering
To implement policy routing, we augment each prefix an-
nouncement with a set of permissible source prefixes S:
R = {d : s/m, S, M}
such that data traffic coming from those address prefixes is
allowed to access service s provided by destination address
d. We define S = {p1, p2, ..., pn}; each pi (0 ≤ i ≤ n) is
a source address prefix. Thus no source prefix constraint is
specified if S = φ. (Alternately, S = {0/0}, i.e., all addresses
are accepted; for clarity in this paper, we prefer to distinguish
between no source prefix constraints and one that happens to
have no effect.) In some situations, it is possible to implement
S as a Bloom filter [5] on the set of source addresses or
networks of a given prefix length. Bloom filters are a space-
efficient data structure that can compress the representation
of a set of members in a compact manner, albeit with some
chance of false positives. Bloom filters are particularly useful
and feasible in MANETs, where there is little topological
structure and each allowed node is identified by a flat address.
Source prefix filtering (SPF) constraints in ROFL control
route propagation and packet forwarding. A ROFL announce-
ment is passed to a node only if that node is authorized
to access the advertised service. During packet forwarding
phase, a packet is dropped immediately if it is coming from
a source address not specified in the SPF constraints of a
matching route. Moreover, this new ROFL scheme is capable
of implementing a complete set of filtering functionalities
provided by traditional firewalls. (See our technical report [20]
for a detailed discussion.) For simplicity, ROFL refers to the
new scheme with SPF for the rest of the discussion.
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Route selection is now based in part on the source address.
Therefore the actual route announcement becomes a form of
policy routing. There are two obvious approaches to inserting
policy constraints into routing announcements. First, all rele-
vant nodes along the route propagation paths could create or
modify the policy statement, in accordance with some central
policy. A better approach would be allowing only the node
advertising the service — the route originator — to embed a
source prefix constraint in routing announcement. Subsequent
receivers of this route announcement do not alter the embedded
policy statement. We suggest the second approach for a few
reasons. First of all, route initiator has the best knowledge
of authorized nodes for the service it provides. Secondly,
allowing intermediate routers to modify policy statements
requires trust relationship established amongst them. More
importantly, the first approach might work for static nodes;
but would not be able to cope with dynamically changing
topologies, like in MANETs. Finally, if were to add some sort
of routing security mechanism similar to S-BGP [12], [13],
changes en route would be much more difficult.
B. The Transit Node Problem
Consider the network topology shown in Figure 1(b). A
node in Net A is advertising a service that a node in Net B
wishes to access; however, the transit node T is not an
authorized source for this service. That is, the source address
policy advertised for this service includes Nets B and C, but
not T. What should happen? One option would be to permit
traffic from B to T; after all, Net B is an authorized source.
This in turn would require that the border node in Net A
advertise the service to T, which would presumably pass it
on to Net B. This option is insecure: when packets for the
service arrive at Net A, it is not possible to tell whether they
originated from Net B or were forged by transit node T. We
thus adopt the following policies: 1) Routing advertisements
are never propagated to a node not authorized for that service,
according to the originator’s policy; 2) Packets for a service
are only accepted from nodes to which routing advertisements
were sent. In a wired net, this is generally easy; in a MANET,
it will likely require some form of cryptographic authentication
of the neighboring node, since in a wireless environment it is
generally very difficult to determine the precise source of a
packet. These principles are not related to route aggregation.
A shorter prefix may be transmitted to T if and only if such
a prefix already existed and T was authorized for it.
IV. ALGORITHMS
Routers are generally composed of two fundamental mecha-
nisms, the control plane and the data plane. The control plane,
sometimes known as route generation, produces a valid path
from source to destination by exchanging routing information
with other nodes. The data plane, or message forwarding,
relays packets from node to node until they reach their
final destination, following the selected route. In ROFL, we
implement packet filtering by layering it on top of routing.
ROFL is agnostic to the specific type of routing protocols
used; only slight modifications are needed during the route
propagation and the packet forwarding phases.
Because we do not change route calculations or prefix
lookups, our new ROFL scheme can cope well with any
distance vector or link state algorithms: route announcements
in ROFL with source prefix filtering are handled the same
way as conventional ones during this phase. There are some
changes, however. Therefore, in this section we present our
algorithms for route propagation and packet forwarding.
A. Route Propagation
Depending on the dissemination pattern of routing infor-
mation provided by underlying routing protocol, we propose
several variants for route propagation.
1) Route Propagation via Unicast: If point-to-point dis-
semination of routing announcements is possible, like in a
wired network, a service provider has full control over the
propagation of service specific routes.
Service provider (i.e., the
ROUTEPROPucast(u)
1 if u provides s
2 R← genRt(d, s,m, S,M);
3 else
4 S ← recvRt(R);
5 calculateFIB(R);
6 for each neighbor h ∈ Nb
7 if S == φ or h ∈ S
8 sendRt(R, h);




2), and then propagates
R only to neighbors that
are allowed to access that
service (Line 6-8). Upon receipt of R, a node extracts source
prefix constraint information S from R (Line 4), calculates
its forwarding information base (FIB) to reflect the update
from newly received route (Line 5), and continues forwarding
R to its authorized neighbors.
2) Route Propagation via Broadcast: If routing information
is disseminated into a network through broadcast by the un-
derlying routing protocol, such as the flooding phase in many
table-driven MANET routing protocols, it is the receiver’s
responsibility to make a processing and forwarding decision
by consulting enclosed source prefix filtering information.
Service provider u ini-
ROUTEPROPbcast(u)
1 if u provides s
2 R← genRt(d, s,m, S,M);
3 bcastRT(R);
4 else
5 S ← recvRt(R);





tiates a ROFL announce-
ment R disseminated into
the network via broadcast
(lines 1-3). When a node
u receives this announce-
ment, it first retrieves the
SPF constraints S enclosed
(line 5), and then makes a
processing and forwarding
decision by consulting S (lines 6-10). If u is an authorized
receiver, it shall update its routing table and forwarding infor-
mation base (FIB) accordingly and then continue broadcasting
R (lines 7-8); otherwise, R is silently discarded (line 10).
3) Route Propagation via Multicast: Another alternative
for route propagation can be performed via multicast. Sup-
pose there is a separate multicast address for each policy,
then ROFL announcements for that policy are sent to that
multicast address; only nodes listening to that address will
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normally receive it. This approach requires a pre-established
multicast group for each policy implemented. Moreover, a
secure multicast can be performed by assigning group key
only to authorized receivers belonging to that group, using
available key management mechanism for MANETs.
B. Packet Forwarding
Once a path is established between a source and destination
pair by underlying routing protocol, every node along the
path consults its local routing table T to make forwarding
decision. Upon receiving a data
PKTFORWARD(u)
1 ps, pd, sd ← procPkt(K);
2 if u is the destination
3 S ← getSPF(sd);





9 if R← findRt(T, pd, sd)
10 S ← extractRt(R);






packet K, node u obtains
source address ps, destina-
tion address pd and des-
tination port number sd
from packet header (Line
1). If K arrives at its des-
tination and indeed comes
from an authorized source,
the packet is passed to up-
per layer (Line 2-7); Other-
wise K needs to be further
routed. Node u consults its
routing table T based on pd
and sd (Line 9). If a matching route R is found, u extracts
the source prefix constraint from R (Line 10). Then K is for-
warded towards its destination if it’s from an authorized source
(Line 11-12). Otherwise, this packet is silently discarded.
Line 3-7 implements a distributed firewall at destination host
by checking packet source for service sd. This would drop
malicious traffic coming from direct neighbors, since there is
no intermediate routers in between that can act as firewalls.
C. Discussion
Our route propagation and packet forwarding algorithms
described above are similar to those dealing with conven-
tional routing advertisements. With ROFL, though, there is
an additional check against the source prefix constraint which
constraints route propagation and packet forwarding decision
at each node. For a detailed proof of correctness of those
algorithms, please refer to our technical report [20].
V. PROTOCOL DESIGN
ROFL can be easily adopted by a large number of routing
protocols with minor modifications, while being transparent
to upper layers. Characteristics of underlying routing protocol
determine applicable variant of route propagation algorithm
discussed previously. Once the routing table and the forward-
ing information base (FIB) are successfully updated upon
receipt of ROFL announcements, packet forwarding is straight
forward following algorithm PKTFORWARD(). Thus, we focus
on propagation of ROFL announcements in MANETs.
Classification of MANET routing protocols could be done in
many ways [16]. One common taxonomy is to categorize them
in terms of routing strategy: reactive routing (on demand),
proactive routing (table-driven), and hybrid routing which
combines previous two. Another popular classification is based
on how routing paths are computing at each node using
different routing information. For a comprehensive study, we
carefully chose two routing protocols: Ad hoc On-Demand
Distance Vector (AODV) protocol [15], a reactive routing
protocol using distance vector information, and Optimized
Link Stat Routing (OLSR) protocol [10], a proactive routing
protocol using link state information.
A. ROFL with AODV
AODV [15] is one of the most popular on demand routing
protocols for MANETs. It doesn’t require routing paths to be
established before the presence of active communication. If a
route to the destination is not available, a node broadcasts a
route request (RREQ) message using an expanding ring search
technique. A route reply (RREP) message is then generated
by either the destination node or an intermediate node that has
a valid route to that destination.
To implement ROFL scheme with AODV, we replace con-
ventional routing information embedded in a RREP message
with service specific announcement that include a service
port number and source prefix constraints. As RREP traverses
towards the route requester, ROFL announcement is stored
at each intermediate node following the ROUTEPROPucast()
algorithm, because RREP is unicast back to the route initiator
along the reverse path that RREQ traversed. We also piggy-
back client route information in RREQ messages initiated by
the route requestor at the beginning. Therefore, our implemen-
tation doesn’t require extra control messages to be transmitted
comparing to its non-ROFL counterpart (i.e., pure AODV).
B. Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)
OLSR [10] is a commonly deployed table-driven routing
protocol for MANETs, that makes use of link state information
to compute shortest paths to all destinations in the network. To
reduce flooding overhead, only nodes, selected as Multipoint
Relays (MPR), are responsible for forwarding control traffic
disseminated into the entire network. Hello (HELLO) message
contains the link information with the 2-hop neighborhood
of a node, and Topology Control (TC) message declares link
availability between a node to its MPR selectors. Without loss
of generality, we assume that each node has only one interface
participating in OLSR routing. Multiple Interface Declaration
(MID) messages are irrelevant to route discovery.
With ROFL, service specific routes with source prefix
constraints are embedded in each HELLO message and TC
message without extra control messages. Since those messages
are broadcast, route propagation algorithm ROUTEPROPbcast()
is implemented for OLSR. Therefore, we implement ROFL
scheme with AODV and OLSR respectively. Although the
implementation is protocol-specific, ROFL announcements are
treated just like any conventional routing advertisements in
those protocols. Most of the implementation effort is dealing
with routing table maintenance, and its cost has been analyzed
quantitatively in our previous work [21].
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VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate ROFL’s performance with two routing proto-
cols, namely AODV and OLSR, in a simulation environment,
as there are not many MANETs actually deployed. We vary the
amount of malicious traffic present in the network to analyze
data traffic and control traffic incurred respectively in ROFL
under a carefully chosen mobility model.
A. Simulation Setup
We implemented ROFL in GloMoSim [2], where 100 nodes,
with transmission range of 250 m, are randomly deployed in a
simulation area of 1500×1500 m2. Our goal is to demonstrate
the high performance of ROFL as an effective and efficient
firewall mechanism especially for MANETs. Without presence
of unwanted traffic, no firewall mechanism is able to prove its
effectiveness. Hence, in our experiments, one key parameter
is the amount of malicious traffic injected into the network.
We generate 30 CBR flows, each consisting of data packets
of 512 Bytes transmitted between a pair of randomly chosen
source and destination nodes at a rate of 4 pkts/sec. Thus
we observe both intra-group and inter-group communications
(w.r.t. RPGM). We vary the amount of malicious traffic from
0% to 100% with an increase of 10% each time. Situations
with more than 70% malicious traffic, although unlikely to
occur in reality, are used to verify the correctness of ROFL.
Individual random mobility patterns, like Random Waypoint
(RWP) or Random Walk (RW), are found to have flaws or
limitations [6]. In a MANET, such as in military deployment
or disaster recovery, grouped motion behavior is very often.
Thus we import Reference Point Group Mobility (RPGM)
model generated using BonnMotion [1]. In RPGM [11], nodes
are partitioned into groups based on their logical relationship.
The movement of an individual node is captured by its group
motion plus a random motion from its reference point. To
evaluate ROFL’s performance as a purely distributed firewall
mechanism, we set the averaged number of nodes per group
to 10, and vary the maximum speed of node movement from
[0, 5, 10, 15, 20] m/s. Notice that 20 m/s corresponds to
72 km/hr, which is a reasonable maximum speed of a vehicle
in MANETs, though perhaps too fast for military models.
The performance of ROFL is evaluated against distributed
firewalls [4], where firewall policies are centrally computed
and pushed to each end host. Thus filtering of malicious traffic
is at destinations only. We are particularly interested in the
amount of data traffic and control traffic incurred both with and
without ROFL; other metrics, such as throughputs, end-to-end
delays, etc, are not our focus, as they are generally considered
as performance metrics of underlying routing protocols. Each
experiment runs for 900 sec with 30 sec pause period. Results
collected from each experiment are averaged from 20 runs.
(Due to the space limitation, we omit simulation results with
ROFL using RWP mobility model.)
B. Performance of Routing Protocols with RPGM
Prior to conducting experiments with ROFL scheme, we
evaluated the performance of AODV and OLSR across the set
of RPGM models with various degrees of mobility in Fig-
ure 2(a). Clearly, both AODV and OLSR didn’t achieve their
best performance under RPGM. Previous studies on group
mobility models [3], [14] demonstrated that compared with
flat routing schemes, such as AODV or DSDV, hierarchical or
cluster-based routing protocols exhibits much better scalability.
Therefore it is not surprising to observe more fluctuation
of these performance curves when parameters, like group
size or movement pattern, are further tuned for this purpose.
ROFL implements packet filtering by taking advantage of
underlying routing mechanisms. Thus its performance cannot
be completely isolated from the behavior of underlying routing
protocols that are used. Results in Figure 2(a) serves as a
baseline evaluation for subsequent experiments.
C. Scenario 1. ROFL with AODV
Figure 2(b) depicts the reduction of data packets received
at destinations using ROFL comparing against the distributed
firewall approach, given that the percentage of malicious traffic
present in the network varies from 0% to 100%. The line
with Vmax = 0 m/s represents a static ad hoc network;
whereas Vmax = 20 m/s demonstrates a highly dynamic
MANET. (Data packet loss occurs due to several reasons,
such as node mobility, collision at link layer, etc.) Ideally, data
packet reduction increases by 10% each time with the growth
of malicious traffic. Obviously, with distributed firewalls,
malicious packets are not dropped until reaching their final
destinations; hence data packets observed at destinations are
not affected by malicious traffic present.
In ROFL, unwanted packets are dropped further away from
destinations depending on how far ROFL announcements can
propagate in the network. We observe a significant reduction
of data packets at destinations in Figure 2(b), that clearly
increases with the growth of malicious traffic. When nodes
start moving faster, we notice slight fluctuations caused by
rapidly changing topology. We believe these fluctuations are
closely related to the performance of underlying routing pro-
tocols rather than ROFL itself (see the baseline scenario in
Figure 2(a)). With a maximum speed of 20 m/s, we still
observe significant packet reduction following the same trend.
As energy conservation is crucial in MANETs, it is benefi-
cial and desirable to save battery power by reducing unneces-
sary transmissions. Figure 2(d) and 2(e) illustrate the reduction
of packet transmission for data traffic and control traffic re-
spectively. Data packets transmitted in the network counts not
only packets generated at their origins but relaying effort made
by intermediate nodes. By dropping unwanted data packets as
early as possible, we experience significant reduction of data
packets with the growth of malicious traffic. In addition, ROFL
triggers reduction of control traffic, as route requests (RREQs)
from malicious (i.e., unauthorized) nodes are dropped silently
by neighbors which have seen that ROFL announcement
before. However, reduction of control traffic flattens when
there are significant amount of malicious traffic but very little
legitimate flows in the network (at y = 80%, 90%, 100% in
































(a) Performance of AODV and OLSR under RPGM












































































































































































(f) Reduction of data packet transmissions using
ROFL with OLSR.
Fig. 2: Performance evaluation of ROFL in a simulation environment.
routing strategy, a service-specific route announcement gets
disseminated into the network when there exists a permissive
routing request (RREQ). With very little legitimate data traffic,
hence very few permissive route requests, we cannot benefit
further from ROFL. Moreover, increases of nodes mobility
only introduces slight degradation of ROFL’s performance.
D. Scenario 2. ROFL with OLSR
Figure 2(c) shows the reduction of data packets received
at destinations using ROFL with OLSR as the underlying
routing protocol, with malicious traffic varying from 0% to
100%. Obviously, ROFL achieves an incremental reduction of
received data packets at destinations along with the growth
of malicious traffic, even under a highly dynamic network
topology. With OLSR, service-specific route announcements
originated from service providers are disseminated into the
entire network via the flooding of Topology Control (TC)
messages. Theoretically, with ROFL, each participant in the
network has a complete knowledge of services, that they are
allowed to access. Thus malicious packets are expected to be
dropped very close to their origins. Figure 2(f) shows the
reduction of data packet transmissions. Unlike with AODV,
ROFL doesn’t affect control traffic transmission in OLSR;
because OLSR implements table-driven routing approach with
routing information periodically flooded to the entire network.
E. Discussion
Experiments with two different MANET routing protocols
demonstrate that ROFL outperforms distributed firewalls by
effectively reducing the amount of data transmission with
various amount of malicious traffic. Implementation overhead
of ROFL includes both the extra cost of maintaining routing
table with service specific entries and the cost of transmitting
control traffic in the network. The former has been discussed
analytically in our previous work [21]. With the growth of
nodes mobility, we still observe the same trend. As a recap,
we summarize the performance of ROFL with small amount
of malicious traffic (as that is often the case in reality) under
various degree of mobility in Tables I, II, and III.
Node Mobility
Malicious Traffic 0 m/s 5 m/s 10 m/s 15 m/s 20 m/s
10% 9.8% 8.5% 8.4% 8.7% 8.4%
20% 18.9% 15.9% 18.6% 17.9% 17.8%
TABLE I: Reduction of data packet transmission using ROFL with AODV,
given small amount of malicious traffic.
10% 10.7% 11.6% 11.5% 11.7% 11.8%
20% 21.6% 21.8% 21.4% 19.0% 16.7%
TABLE II: Reduction of control packet transmission using ROFL with
AODV, given small amount of malicious traffic.
10% 9.9% 9.4% 8.7% 7.7% 8.0%
20% 19.8% 18.0% 17.5% 16.2% 16.4%
TABLE III: Reduction of data packet transmission using ROFL with
OLSR, given small amount of malicious traffic.
Clearly, ROFL achieves high performance in terms of
the reduction of data traffic and control traffic transmission
regardless of the network mobility. For instance, for AODV,
with nodes moving at 10 m/s and a 10% bad traffic rate,
ROFL reduced the number of data packet and control packet
transmissions by 8.4% and 11.5% respectively; at 20% bad
traffic, the reduction were 18.6% and 21.4%. For OLSR, with
nodes moving at the same speed, ROFL reduced the amount
of data packet transmission by 8.7% (at 10% bad traffic) and
17.5% (at 20% bad traffic) respectively.
Apart from above results, we also observe some interesting
phenomena. In the first scenario with AODV, malicious nodes
are induced to generate more routing requests (RREQs), as
previous ones were silently dropped by neighbors who have
seen the relevant ROFL announcement with embedded source
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prefix filtering information before. Depending on how aggres-
sive the attacker is, it may generate much more control traffic
without being able to establish a valid route. Thus our scheme
indeed helps to drain their battery power faster, which can
disable the compromised nodes. Possibly, such an abnormal
rate of route advertisements can be useful input to an intrusion
detection system, though we have not investigated this.
One further aspect is worth mentioning. With group mobil-
ity models, if the groups move too far apart ROFL is more
likely to result in network partitioning. We do not regard this
as a flaw in ROFL; rather, it is a tradeoff between one form of
availability (a connected network) and both a second form of
availability (battery power) and confidentiality: traffic is not
sent through nodes not trusted to handle it. A likely solution
would involve some number of trusted, higher-powered trans-
mitters coupled with a hierarchical routing scheme. We have
not yet evaluated this alternative. Therefore, we conclude that
ROFL is an effective and efficient firewall mechanism for ad
hoc networks that are highly dynamic.
VII. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been much work
on implementing firewall techniques in MANETs, largely due
to the rapidly changing network topology. As battery supply
remains crucial in MANETs, filtering unwanted traffic as early
as possible — which a firewall can do — is quite important.
A survey paper on power and security can be found in [17],
where they categorized denial-of-sevice (DoS) attacks and de-
fenses by protocol layers, especially for those attacks that tar-
get energy supply of a battery-powered device. However, like
many other papers in this field they point out the severity of
battery exhaustion attacks but do not provide a useful solution.
SANE and Ethane [7], [8] are similar, in that they have many
forwarding nodes within the network enforcing a security
policy. However, the scheme is intended for centralized policy
control, rather than source-specific policy decisions. As such,
it requires the central policy controller to be in contact with
all forwarding nodes whenever policy changes. Furthermore,
it lacks the built-in universal enforcement guarantees provided
by the routing mechanisms ROFL relies on; this in turn means
that it could not cope well with a MANET environment
where the topology frequently changes. There are previous
works on en-route packet filtering in sensor networks [18],
[22]. However, they took a different approach by focusing
on implementing authentication schemes for sensor networks.
Filtering decision are made by group checking on some kind
of message endorsement generated by a number of sensor
nodes, when the packet is en-route to its destination; whereas
in ROFL, we implement packet filtering by using underlying
routing mechanisms.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
ROFL with source prefix filtering successfully solves the
MANET firewall problem. First, it creates boundaries between
regions that have different policies, even when the topology —
and hence the boundary — changes. Furthermore, it does so in
an appropriate fashion: the same policy specifications control
both service routing advertisements and traffic acceptance.
Second, by dropping unwanted packets very early, there is
a large savings in battery power across the entire MANET,
thus eliminating a major denial-of-service issue, in both of
the major types of MANET routing.
As part of our ongoing work, we take a policy refinement
approach by examining the transformation from high level
security policies into low level rules that can be implemented
using ROFL as the enforcement mechanism. There, we are
particularly interesting in adaption to policy changes and
how that would affect generation and dissemination of ROFL
advertisements in consequence.
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